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Comments
The Pennsylvania Reformed Divorce Code: Equitable
Distribution of Marital Property
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1980, the Pennsylvania state legislature adopted the reformed
Divorce Code,' which encompassed sweeping changes in a body of
law that had been substantially unchanged since 1785.2 The enact-
ment of these changes, occasioned by emphatic social and political
debate in the legislature,3 caused Pennsylvania to join the over-
whelming majority of states in providing for no-fault grounds for
divorce, as well as allowing the award of alimony after divorce6
and the distribution of marital property.8
Prior to enactment of the 1980 Code, only fault grounds were
available to sustain a cause of action in divorce,7 requiring that the
1. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 101-801 (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984).
2. H. TEITELBAUM, The Pennsylvania Divorce Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, Commen-
tary at 343-60 (Purdon 1955).
3. See J. FISHMAN, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1980 PENNSYLVANIA DIVORCE LAW
(1981). The reformed code underwent seven revisions before acceptance; the legislature's
debates comprise over one hundred pages in the legislative journals. Id. at iv.
4. The other states retaining only fault grounds are South Dakota and Illinois. S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-4-2 (Smith 1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 301 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1979).
5. At this time, every state permits an award of post-divorce alimony except Texas.
See TEX. FAs. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon 1975).
Prior to 1980, the only circumstances permitting any award of alimony in Pennsylvania
were the insanity of the divorced spouse, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 45 (Purdon 1955) (re-
pealed 1980); the pendency of the decree of divorce, allowing alimony pendente lite, id. § 46;
and following a divorce from bed and board, a "quasi-divorce" wherein the parties live sepa-
rately but the marriage continues. Id. § 47. The 1980 code permits a court to award alimony
if it is determined that the spouse seeking alimony lacks both sufficient property to provide
for his or her reasonable needs and is unable to support himself or herself through appropri-
ate employment. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 501(a) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984).
6. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 401-04 (Purdon Supp. 1983-84).
7. Under the prior law, the available grounds were desertion for two years, adultery,
bigamy, impotency, cruel and barbarous treatment, indignities, fraud, duress or coercion in
the procurement of the marriage, and conviction of a felony resulting in a sentence of at
least two years imprisonment. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10(1) (Purdon 1955)(repealed 1980).
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plaintiff-spouse be "injured and innocent" and without marital
fault.' The practical effect of these limitations was to encourage
perjury on the part of the "innocent" spouse in order to establish
the existence of the grounds,9 and often, given the lack of alimony
or distribution of marital property, virtually insured that even
those "uncontested" divorces granted would be preceded by adver-
sarial negotiation concerning property and support rights."0
Although the lack of no-fault grounds was a major contributing
element in the status of Pennsylvania as a state with neither a
modern nor a realistic view of marriage, it is possible that the pri-
mary impetus toward change in the law was Pennsylvania's adher-
ence to the common law property theory in divorce."' Upon di-
vorce, property was distributed between the spouses solely on the
basis of in whose name the property was titled. Thus, the only
property held by the parties capable of being affected by divorce
was property held jointly or by the entireties." The practical ap-
plication of the title theory frequently resulted in depriving a de-
pendent, non-working spouse of any interest in property held in
the name of the working spouse. This, when combined with the
prohibition against post-divorce alimony, effectively left the de-
pendent spouse with no source of support, and unprepared for en-
try into the labor market. Consequently, that spouse was often
forced into the public welfare system.'3
This antiquated, often unjust, system of post-divorce property
Under the 1980 code, the above grounds are retained with the exception of impotency and
fraud, and the desertion provision has been reduced to one year. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
201(a)(Purdon Supp. 1983-1984). In addition, the new code provides for the bilateral and
unilateral no-fault grounds. Under bilateral no-fault grounds, a divorce may be granted
where both parties consent to the divorce and where ninety days have passed from the filing
of the complaint alleging that the marriage is irretrievably broken. Id. § 201(c). The unilat-
eral ground permits a court to grant a divorce when it finds the marriage to be irretrievably
broken, based on the complaint of one spouse alone, and when the parties have lived sepa-
rate and apart for three years. Id. § 201(d)(1). In appropriate circumstances, the court may
order counseling. Id. § 201(d)(2).
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 10 (Purdon 1955)(repealed 1980).
9. Morrissey, A Pennsylvania Primer for Alimony and Equitable Distribution, 47
PA.B.A.Q. 503 (1976).
10. See Morrissey, supra note 9, at 505.
11. There are primarily three possible approaches to property distribution upon di-
vorce: a common law approach, equitable distribution, and community property. For an
overview of the operation of the common law approach in Pennsylvania, see Perlberger,
Marital Property Distribution: Legal and Emotional Considerations, 25 VILL. L. REv. 662,
666-72 (1980).
12. See Perlberger, supra note 11, at 670.
13. See FISHMAN, supra note 3, at 1427.
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distribution in effect virtually ignored the marital contributions of
the non-working spouse, and hardly reflected the modern view of
marriage as a partnership in a common endeavor in which both
parties perform essential, if not remunerated, functions. However,
with the enactment of the new code came the recognition that
marital property would neither be acquired nor maintained with-
out the efforts and cooperation of both spouses. The new code re-
flects this attitude, by granting a court a wide range of powers to
protect the interests of both parties14 while it equitably divides the
property accumulated during the marriage.
Specifically, it is section 4011" of the new code which effects the
14. A court is empowered to determine and dispose of property rights, child custody
and visitation rights, child support and alimony, and to enforce voluntarily entered separa-
tion agreements. In addition, a court is given "all necessary powers, including but not lim-
ited to" the power of contempt and to attach wages, and may order the payment of costs
and counsel fees. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 401(b)(Purdon Supp. 1983-1984). See infra note
15. Further, a court is given full equity power and jurisdiction and may issue injunctions or
other orders to effectuate the provisions of the code. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
401(c)(Purdon Supp. 1983-1984). See infra note 15. See, e.g., Baron v. Baron, 23 Pa. D. &
C.3d 62 (C.P. Lawrence 1982) (court has power to stay the tax sale of marital home pending
equitable distribution of marital property). A court may also issue an injunction to prevent
a spouse from removing him or herself or property from the court's jurisdiction, and such
property may be attached. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 403 (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984). See,
e.g., Jacono v. Jacono, 69 Delaware Co. Rep. 587 (C.P. 1982); Strouse v. Strouse, 77
Schuykill L. Rec. 83 (C.P. 1981).
For further examples of the court's equity power, see Klinefelter v. Klinefelter, 18 Centre
Co.L.J. 79 (C.P. 1983) (court may award interest charges to enforce a right to monies due
under an equitable distribution award); Zeigler v. Zeigler, 24 Adams Co. L. J. 143 (C.P.
1982) (court may order the sale of marital property to third party when property cannot be
otherwise equitably divided).
15. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 401 (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984) provides:
(a) In all matrimonial causes, the court having jurisdiction may either dismiss the
complaint or enter a decree of divorce or annulment of the marriage.
(b) Any decree granting a divorce or an annulment, shall include after a full hearing,
where these matters are raised in the complaint, the answer or other petition, an
order or orders determining and disposing of existing property rights and interests
between the parties, custody and visitation rights, child support, alimony and any
other related matters including the enforcement of separation agreements voluntarily
entered into between the parties. In the enforcement of the rights of any party to any
such matters, the courts shall have all necessary powers, including but not limited to,
the power of contempt and the power to attach wages. In the event that the court is
unable for any reason to determine and dispose of the matters provided for in this
subsection within 30 days after the master'l report has been filed, it may enter a
decree of divorce or annulment. The court may order alimony, reasonable counsel
fees and expenses pending final disposition of the matters provided for in this subsec-
tion and upon final disposition, the court may award costs to the party in whose favor
the order or decree shall be entered, or may order that each party shall pay his or her
own costs, or may order that costs be divided equitably as it shall appear just and
reasonable.
(c) In all matrimonial causes, the court shall have full equity power and jurisdiction
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most significant change from prior law. This section empowers the
and may issue injunctions or other orders which are necessary to protect the interests
of the parties or to effectuate the purposes of this act, and may grant such other relief
or remedy as equity and justice require against either party or against any third per-
son over whom the court has jurisdiction and who is involved in or concerned with
the disposition of the cause.
(d) In a proceeding for divorce or annulment, the court shall, upon request of either
party, equitably divide, distribute or assign the marital property between the parties
without regard to marital misconduct in such proportions as the court deems just
after considering all relevant factors including:
(1) The length of the marriage.
(2) Any prior marriage of either party.
(3) The age, health, station, amount and sources of income, vocational skills,
employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties.
(4) The contribution by one party to the education, training, or increased
earning power of the other party.
(5) The opportunity of each party for future acquisitions of capital assets
and income.
(6) The sources of income of both parties, including but not limited to medi-
cal, retirement, insurance or other benefits.
(7) The contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preserva-
tion, depreciation or appreciation of the marital property, including the contri-
bution of a party as homemaker.
(8) The value of the property set apart to each party.
(9) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage.
(10) The economic circumstances of each party at the time the division of
property is to become effective.
(e) For purposes of this chapter only, "marital property" means all property acquired
by either party during the marriage except:
(1) Property acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the mar-
riage except for the increase in value during the marriage.
(2) Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties entered into before,
during or after the marriage.
(3) Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent except for the in-
crease in value during the marriage.
(4) Property acquired after separation until the date of divorce, provided
however, if the parties separate and reconcile, all property acquired subsequent
to the final separation until their divorce.
(5) Property which a party has sold, granted, conveyed or otherwise disposed
of in good faith and for value prior to the time proceedings for the divorce are
commenced.
(6) Veterans' benefits exempt from attachment, levy or seizure pursuant to
the act of September 2, 1958, Public Law 85-857, 72 Statute 12291, as
amended, except for those benefits received by a veteran where such veteran
has waived a portion of his military retirement pay in order to receive Vet-
eran's Compensation.
(7) Property to the extent to which such property has been mortgaged or
otherwise encumbered in good faith for value, prior to the time proceedings for
the divorce are commenced.
(f) All property, whether real or personal, acquired by either party during the mar-
riage is presumed to be marital property regardless of whether title is held individu-
ally or by the parties in some form of co-ownership such as joint tenancy, tenancy in
common or tenancy by the entirety. The presumption of marital property is overcome
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court, upon the request of either party, to "equitably divide, dis-
tribute, or assign" marital property to either spouse, 6 regardless of
the fault of either party, and regardless of any form of co-owner-
ship or in whose name the real or personal property is titled.
17
In the three years since the enactment of this statute, the lower
courts of Pennsylvania have construed and applied these provi-
sions to a wide variety of specific questions which are not answered
by the language of the statute: What types of property are capable
of distribution? Will the increase in the value of any property
owned separately before marriage be treated as marital property?
As of what date will marital property be subject to valuation?
What distribution between the parties is indeed equitable in a spe-
cific factual situation?
Few of the decisions of the county courts of common pleas ap-
plying the provisions of section 401 have yet been affirmed or over-
ruled by the appellate courts of Pennsylvania. This comment will
review a number of these decisions of the courts of common pleas
in order to provide an overview of the construction and application
of the reformed code.
II. DEFINITION OF MARITAL PROPERTY
"Marital property" is defined by the code as all property ac-
quired by either party during the marriage,"' while property ac-
by showing that the property was acquired by a method listed in subsection (e).
(g) The court may impose a lien or charge upon the marital property assigned to a
party as security for the payment of alimony or other award for the other party.
(h) The court may award to one, each, or both of the parties the right to live in the
family home for reasonable periods of time.
(i) The court may also direct the continued maintenance and beneficiary designations
of existing policies insuring the life of either party. The court's power under this
subsection shall extend only to policies originally purchased during the marriage and
owned by or within the effective control of either party.
() Whenever a decree or judgment is granted which nullifies or absolutely terminates
the bonds of matrimony, any and all property rights which are dependent upon such
marital relation, save those which are vested rights, are terminated unless the court
otherwise expressly provides in its decree in accordance with subsection (b). All du-
ties, rights, and claims accruing to either of said parties at any time heretofore in
pursuance of the said marriage, shall cease and the parties shall, severally, be at lib-
erty to marry again in like manner as if they had never been married, except where
otherwise provided by law.
Id.
16. 23 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 401(d) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984). See supra note 15 for
the text of the statute.
17. 23 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 401(0 (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984). See supra note 15 for
the text of the statute.
18. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 401(e) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984). See supra note 15 for
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quired prior to marriage remains the separate property of either
spouse.19 The code provides that all real or personal property ac-
quired during the marriage will be presumed to be marital prop-
erty; this presumption may be overcome by a showing that the spe-
cific property falls within one of seven statutory exceptions: (1)
property acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the
marriage except for the increase in value during the marriage; (2)
property excluded by valid agreement of the parties entered into
before, during or after marriage; (3) property acquired by gift, be-
quest, devise or descent except for the increase in value during the
marriage; (4) property acquired after separation; (5) property
which a party has sold, conveyed, or disposed of in good faith and
for value prior to the commencement of the divorce action; (6)
Veterans' benefits exempt from attachment pursuant to Public
Law 85-857, 72 Statute 12291; (7) property to the extent to which
it has been mortgaged or encumbered in good faith for value prior
to the commencement of the divorce action.
20
A. Retroactive Application
An important issue, the resolution of which has and will have a
significant effect in any equitable distribution proceeding, concerns
property acquired by either party during the marriage but prior to
the effective date of the code. The retroactive application of the
equitable distribution provisions was held to be unconstitutional
by at least two county courts, 1 while other courts reached the op-
posite conclusion. 2' The constitutionality of these provisions was
upheld in Bacchetta v. Bacchetta, s the only case concerning the
construction and constitutionality of the code to be decided by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court since its enactment. In reversing the
lower court's holding that the retroactive application of section 401
was unconstitutional, the supreme court concluded that it is within
the permissible exercise of the legislature's police power to provide
the text of the statute.
19. Each party has complete freedom to dispose of this separate property after divorce
without the consent of the other unless otherwise provided by the court. 23 PA. CONs. STAT.
ANN. § 402(e) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984).
20. Id. § 401(e).
21. Bacchetta v. Bacchetta, 29 Chester Co. Rep. 167 (C.P. 1981); Krenzelak v. Krenze-
lak, 62 Washington Co. Rep. 53 (C.P. 1981).
22. Brookens v. Brookens, 5 Franklin Co. L. J. 146 (C.P. 1982); lannetta v. lannetta,
37 Bucks Co. L. Rep. 34 (C.P. 1981); Kline v. Kline, 67 Lancaster L. Rev. 319 (C.P. 1981).
23. 498 Pa. 227, 445 A.2d 1194 (1982). See 21 DuQ. L. REv. 1137 (1983).
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for the distribution of property upon divorce,24 and that due pro-
cess considerations are not violated when this exercise is reasona-
ble and has a substantial relationship to the objective sought to be
obtained.2 Hence, the legislature's aim of mitigating divorce's eco-
nomic harm and effecting a fair and just determination of property
rights, as well as equitable distribution as the means of achieving
that aim, was held to withstand a constitutional attack.2 6
B. Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans
An issue frequently occurring as the Pennsylvania courts find
their way in applying the equitable distribution provisions is that
of the classification of specific interests and properties: whether,
and to what extent, these interests are marital property subject to
distribution.
In many cases, the assets of the parties may consist primarily of
the marital residence and pension, retirement or profit-sharing
plans.2 7 It is clear that a home acquired by the parties during the
marriage is property subject to distribution.2 8 However, the issue
of pension and profit-sharing plans has been the subject of consid-
erable discussion by the courts of all equitable distribution states,
the majority of which hold that an interest in a pension plan is
marital property.2 9 Pennsylvania courts have followed this result.30
However, some distinction has been made between vested and non-
vested pensions,31 the latter being the source of some controversy.
While vested pension interests, like those that have matured and
24. 498 Pa. at 233, 445 A.2d at 1197.
25. Id. at 234, 445 A.2d at 1197.
26. Id. at 235, 445 A.2d at 1198.
27. Kalinoski v. Kalinoski, 9 F.L.R. 3033 (C.P. Butler 1983).
28. Although the fair market value of the home will constitute marital property, the
extent of any encumbrance or mortgage will be excepted. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN §
401(e)(7) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984).
29. See, e.g., Kikkert v. Kikkert, 177 N.J. Super. 471, 427 A.2d 76 (1981); Hiscox v.
Hiscox, 179 Ind. App. 378, 385 N.E.2d 1166 (1979).
30. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 131 P.L.J. 119 (C.P. Allegheny 1983)(pension benefits
were considered marital property although no rationale was given); King v. King, 9 F.L.R.
2273 (C.P. Erie 1983)(adopting the law from other jurisdictions that unmatured pension
rights are not free gifts from the employer, but rather, additional compensation earned by
the employee and bargained for); McCallum v. McCallum, 130 P.L.J. 406 (C.P. Allegheny
1982) (pension benefits equitably distributed but no rationale was given); Flowers v. Flow-
ers, 74 Berks County L.J. 168 (C.P. 1982); Willikow v. Willikow, 41 Somerset L.J. 227 (C.P.
1982). The conclusion in these cases is supported by the absence of pension benefits from
the exceptions to marital property listed in 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 401(e) (Purdon Supp.
1983-1984). See supra note 15 for the text of the statute.
31. Kalinoski v. Kalinoski, 9 F.L.R. 3033 (C.P. Butler 1983).
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are being received, are in effect compensation earned by the em-
ployee, 2 non-vested benefits require the satisfaction of certain
threshhold requirements, such as a minimum length of employ-
ment, and in reality are only a contingent future interest.3
The Court of Common Pleas of Butler County, in Kalinoski v.
Kalinoski4 was recently confronted with this issue of whether the
term "property" in the context of equitable distribution may in-
clude unvested pension benefits. Joining the courts of several other
equitable distribution and community property states, 5 the court
concluded that, under the theory that a pension is not an unre-
quited payment, but rather a contract for compensation for ser-
vices already rendered and amounts to an inchoate debt, these
benefits may be considered marital property. 6 This holding, how-
ever, is in conflict with those of other courts of common pleas.
37
In any discussion of the distribution of pension benefits, it is
necessary to distinguish privately funded plans from public and
civil service plans. Concerning military and federal railroad retire-
ment benefits, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that
these benefits are not capable of distribution as marital property
under the federal pre-emption doctrine.38 Although the Supreme
32. King v. King, 9 F.L.R. 2273 (C.P. Erie 1983).
33. Kalinoski v. Kalinoski, 9 F.L.R. at 3035.
34. 9 F.L.R. 3033 (C.P. Butler 1983).
35. See e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 183 Conn. 96, 438 A.2d 839 (1981); Robert C.S.
v. Barbara J.S., 434 A.2d 383 (Del. 1981); Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 437 A.2d 883
(1981); Bloomer v. Bloomer, 84 Wis. 2d 124, 267 N.W.2d 235 (1978). In addition, Virginia
has provided by statute for the equitable distribution of pension benefits. VA. CODE § 20-
107.3(E)(8)(1983).
36. Kalinoski v. Kalinoski, 9 F.L.R. 3033 (C.P. Butler 1983). The court stated that
those states which have held that nonvested pensions are not marital property have done so
on the theory that the valuation of these benefits is too speculative. In refusing to adopt this
result, the court noted that contingent interests are capable of valuation and that specula-
tion does not prevent the valuation of an estate's fairmarket value or the value of goodwill
in business. Therefore, speculating about value should not prevent nonvested pensions from
being classified as marital property. Id. at 3035. Interestingly, a court of common pleas in
the same county refused to order the equitable distribution of a spouse's pension rights
which had not vested at the time of the divorce, but gave no rationale for its refusal. Mc-
Candless v. McCandless, 23 Pa. D. & C.3d 739 (C.P. Butler 1982). Other Pennsylvania
courts have reached the same conclusion as the court in Kalinoski, but have not elaborated
on their reasoning. Paul W. v. Margaret W., 130 P.L.J. 6 (C.P. Allegheny 1981); Reese v.
Reese, 109 Montgomery Co. L. Rep. 295 (C.P. 1981).
37. Tonetti v. Tonetti, 39 Lehigh Co.L.J. 535 (C.P. 1982); Kutzer v. Kutzer, 110 Mont-
gomery Co. L. Rep. 226 (C.P. 1982). It was reasoned in these cases that a pension plan that
was not vested at the time of separation did not constitute even contingent property rights
acquired during marriage, and therefore, any rights in such a pension plan are separate
property.
38. See, e.g., McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981)(federal law precludes state
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Court was not required to rule on the status of federal civil service
retirement benefits or Social Security Act benefits as marital prop-
erty, dicta in the McCarty decision suggests that the former may
be subject to distribution,8 while the latter may not.4 0 While these
issues remain to be settled, conflicting results have been reached.'
C. Life Insurance and Property Acquired During the Marriage
Another asset that may be significant in many proceedings, given
the lack of other property, is life insurance. Courts have found that
the cash value of a life insurance policy acquired and paid for dur-
ing the marriage is marital property." The provision of section
401(i) would seem to provide additional authority for this result;
this section empowers a court to direct "the continued mainte-
nance and beneficiary designations of existing policies . . . origi-
nally purchased during the marriage and owned by or within the
effective control of either party.
'48
The all-inclusive nature of the equitable distribution statute has
permitted the courts of Pennsylvania to reach a finding that cer-
tain property interests are marital property even where those
rights arise from a personal injury. The phrase "all property...
court from dividing military non-disability retirement pay pursuant to state community
property law); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979)(railroad retirement benefits
resulting from employment during marriage are not community property subject to division
upon dissolution of marriage).
39. 453 U.S. at 230 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 8345(j)(1) (1976 & Supp. III)). This legislation
requires that Civil Service retirement benefits be paid to an ex-spouse to the extent pro-
vided for by any court-approved property settlement incident to divorce. Id.
40. 453 U.S. at 230 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 462(c) (1976)). The Social Security Act provides
that benefits payable under the act may be subject to legal process to enforce child support
or alimony obligations; and provides that the term "alimony" does not include a transfer of
property in compliance with a community property or equitable distribution settlement. Id.
41. The subject of federal civil service retirement benefits has been addressed by the
courts of other states, which have held these benefits are not subject to equitable distribu-
tion. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter, 277 S.C. 277, 286 S.E.2d 139 (1982). In Pennsylvania there is
only one decision dealing with Social Security benefits, which held that these benefits are
not marital property. Sorbello v. Sorbello, 21 Pa. D. & C.3d 187 (C.P. Cumberland 1981). At
least one court in another equitable distribution state has held that Social Security benefits
acquired during marriage are marital property. Evans v. Evans, 98 Mich. App. 323, 296
N.W.2d 248 (1980).
42. Krick v. Krick, 74 Berks Co.L.J. 157 (C.P. 1982); Clapper v. Clapper, 41 Somerset
L.J. 215 (C.P. 1982). Since life insurance policies acquired during marriage are not included
in the exceptions to marital property listed in 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 401(e) (Purdon
Supp. 1983-1984), no other conclusion appears possible.
43. 23 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 401(i) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984). See supra note 15.
This section has been construed to allow a court to direct the continuation of an existing
beneficiary designation only, and not to direct that the beneficiary designation be changed.
Holben v. Holben, 41 Beaver Co.L.J. 200 (C.P. 1983).
Duquesne Law Review
acquired during the marriage"44 has been construed by one court
to include settlement proceeds from personal injuury claims when
the cause of action arose during the marriage.45 This result is in
accord with the law of other equitable distribution states, which
also include workers' compensation benefits as marital property
subject to distribution.46 However, this conclusion was not reached
by the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County in Snyder v.
Snyder,'7 which held that even though the husband was also
named as plaintiff in an action brought by his injured wife, he was
only a nominal plaintiff and had no right to the wife's personal
injury settlement. Therefore, the settlement was considered her
separate property.
4'8
D. Professional Degrees & Education
An interest in a business enterprise or a closely-held corporation
that is acquired during marriage presents little controversy in be-
ing given the status of marital property.49 However, a related issue
which has produced differing results as the courts attempt to make
decisions that are fair and equitable is that of the status of a pro-
fessional degree or education. The difficulty in achieving the de-
sired equitable result in these cases has been caused by factual cir-
cumstances in which the non-degreed spouse wholly or
substantially supported the marriage, or at least made a significant
contribution as a homemaker, while the other spouse obtained an
education. The courts of Pennsylvania appear to agree in holding
that a professional degree itself is not marital property subject to
44. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 401(f) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984). See supra note 15.
45. Platek v. Platek, .__-_Pa. Super. -, 454 A.2d 1059 (1982). The court dis-
missed the appellant's contention that the proceeds were separate property by reason of
their origin in her personal injury, supporting its conclusion by citing the legislative history
of the code. The House version of § 401(e), excluding certain interests from marital prop-
erty, also excluded payments received for the loss or impairment of parts or functions of the
body; the Senate subsequently rejected the House version. 454 A.2d at 1061-62.
46. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Dettore, 46 I. App. 3d 540, 408 N.E.2d 429 (1980);
Evans v. Evans, 98 Mich. App. 323, 296 N.W.2d 248 (1980); DiTolvo v. DiTolvo, 131 N.J.
Super. 72, 328 A.2d 625 (1974).
47. 68 Lancaster L. Rev. 436 (C.P. 1982).
48. Id. at 439.
49. See, e.g., Nassif v. Nassif, 131 P.L.J. 122 (C.P. Allegheny 1983) (business real es-
tate and share of oil well was held to be marital property); Lagrotteria v. Lagrotteria, 130
P.L.J. 459 (C.P. Allegheny 1982) (95% interest in real estate business was held to be marital
property); Russek v. Russek, 20 Lebanon Co.L.J. 63 (C.P. 1982) (medical practice estab-
lished during the marriage was held to be marital property).
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distribution,"0 basing their holdings on traditional property con-
cepts that a degree has no objective transferable value and is per-
sonal to the holder.
5 1
Nevertheless, the goal of compensating a spouse for contribu-
tions and efforts made to further the other's education has necessi-
tated the fashioning of some remedy. At least two courts have held
that the contributing spouse is entitled to an interest in the value
of the other's future earnings,52 while at least two other courts
have adopted a method whereby the spouse will be awarded com-
pensatory alimony."5 Of the two approaches, the latter is obviously
the more practical given the difficulties in valuating potential fu-
ture earnings fairly and realistically.
III. EXCEPTIONS TO MARITAL PROPERTY AND PROBLEMS OF
VALUATION
The construction and application of section 401(e), which lists
50. Hodge v. Hodge, 104 Dauphin Co. Rep. 14 (C.P. 1982); Lehmicke v. Lehmicke, 70
Delaware Co. Rep. 89 (C.P. 1982); Pratt v. Pratt, 23 Pa. D. & C.3d 673 (C.P. Lancaster
1982); Millili v. Millili, 111 Montgomery Co. L. Rep. 38 (C.P. 1982).
51. Most equitable distribution jurisdictions, employing similar rationales, have
reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Mahoney v. Mahoney, 182 N.J. Super. 598, 442 A.2d
1062 (1982); Lesman v. Lesman, 88 A.D.2d 153, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1982); In re marriage of
Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978).
52. Lehmicke v. Lehmicke, 70 Delaware Co. Rep. 89 (C.P. 1982); Millili v. Millili, 111
Montgomery Co. L. Rep. 38 (C.P. 1982). In both cases, the court found that the increased
earning capacity of the degreed spouse was to a great extent the product of the other's
labor, sacrifice, or financial support.
53. In Pratt v. Pratt, 23 D. & C.3d 673 (C.P. Lancaster 1982), the court refused to
make an award based on future earnings because they were considered to be too speculative
and presumptive. Id. at 681. Its rationale to instead make an award of alimony was
grounded in § 501(b), which lists factors to be considered by a court in making such an
award. Subsection (6) of § 501(b), see infra note 80, requires a court to consider the "contri-
bution by one party to the education ... or increased earning power of the other party." 23
Pa. D. & C.3d at 683.
The court in Hodge v. Hodge, 104 Dauphin Co. Rep. 14, (C.P. 1982), agreed that an award
of a portion of future earnings was inappropriate, and concluded that § 501(b)(6) directed
an award of alimony, on a theory of unjust enrichment or restitution for the spouse's contri-
butions. 104 Dauphin Co. Rep. at 18.
Neither of these courts acknowledged that the contribution of a spouse to the education
or increased earning power of the other is also a relevant factor to be considered in the
distribution of marital property. See 23 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 401(d)(4) (Purdon Supp.
1983-1984), supra note 15.
Russek v. Russek, 20 Lebanon Co.L.J. 63 (C.P. 1982), although dealing with an already
established medical practice professional corporation held to be marital property, rejected
the notion that future earnings are distributable, on the basis that an award of any future
income, whatever the source, was inappropriate. 20 Lebanon Co. L.J. at 86.
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seven exceptions to marital property, 5' has not been found to be
particularly problematic, possibly because of the relatively plain
language employed by most of the provisions. Nevertheless, several
questions have arisen by way of the interplay between these excep-
tions and the implicit exception of property acquired before the
marriage.
Subsection (1) excludes property "acquired in exchange for
property acquired prior to marriage except for the increase in
value during the marriage." In Johnson v. Johnson,68 the Court of
Common Pleas of Montgomery County was confronted with a dis-
tribution problem wherein a residence, the down payment for
which was supplied from funds acquired from the sale of another
home owned by one party prior to the marriage, was thereafter
placed in joint names."6 The court determined that the most equi-
table approach to the distribution problem was to consider the
placement of the home in joint names as a gift to the marital en-
tity, and that the entire value would be considered marital
property. 7
The exceptions stated in subsection (3) include property ac-
quired by gift, bequest, devise or descent; but, like subsection (1),
they do not include increases in value during the marriage. Unfor-
54. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
55. 109 Montgomery Co. L. Rep. 383 (C.P. 1981).
56. Id. at 384.
57. The court rejected two alternative approaches as inconsistent with the aims of the
code. Under the "traceable assets" approach, any interest owned by one spouse prior to
marriage would remain separate property, and only an increase in value would be distributa-
ble as marital property. 109 Montgomery Co. L. Rep. at 387-88 (citing Sanger v. Sanger, 49
Or. App. 215, 619 P.2d 660 (1980)). However, the non-contributing spouse, after a long mar-
riage and slight increase in value, would be entitled to very little. 109 Montgomery Co. L.
Rep. at 388. The other approach involved following traditional Pennsylvania gift law princi-
ples, which would hold the placement in joint names as a gift to the other spouse of a one-
half interest. This approach would effectively prevent the spouse who originally owned the
home from receiving proper credit for the original contribution. Id. To consider the place-
ment in joint names as a gift to the marital entity effects the intent of the code, and allows
the court to distribute the property according to the factors enumerated in 23 PA. CoNs.
STAT. ANN. § 401(d) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984). See supra note 15 for the text of the stat-
ute. Specifically, subsection 7 directs the court to consider the contribution of each party in
the acquisition of marital property, thereby permitting a spouse to receive credit for the
pre-marital contribution. The court reasoned that this method protects both the party who
purchases a marital home with separate funds and titles it jointly, as well as the party who,
during a long marriage lives in a jointly-held home originally paid for by the other. 109
Montgomery Co. L. Rep. at 389. This approach was employed by the same court in two
subsequent cases: Maser v. Maser, 112 Montgomery Co. L. Rep. 117 (C.P. 1983); and Burry
v. Burry, 111 Montgomery Co. L. Rep. 330 (C.P. 1982); and by another court of common
pleas in Somerset County: Clapper v. Clapper, 41 Somerset L. J. 215 (1982).
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tunately, the question of how to treat an increase in the value of
separate property that is neither acquired through an exchange nor
through inheritance is not answered by the statute.
In confronting this problem, the Court of Common Pleas of Alle-
gheny County, in Birkel v. Birke e rejected a husband's argument
that the legislature's failure to address this specific situation in
section 401(e) revealed an intent to exclude the increase from equi-
table distribution."e Rather, the court reasoned that the legisla-
ture's treatment as marital property of an increase in exchanged
property or gifts and inheritances created a presumption that an
increase in value is due to joint efforts and contributions. The
court concluded that the overall goals of the statute, coupled with
the added direction of subsections (1) and (3), necessitated a hold-
ing that any increase that can be attributed to the substantial con-
tributions and efforts of both parties will be considered marital
property subject to distribution."1
. The same result was reached by a court in Crawford County. In
Starn v. Starn, 2 the court held that although stock acquired
before marriage is not marital property, an increase in its value
was attributable to the wife's contributions in her supporting role
as a homemaker, and was therefore marital property. e
These decisions are not inconsistent with that of the Court of
Common Pleas of Erie County, where in Rudd v. Rudd it was held
that an increase in value of a residence acquired by one spouse
before the marriage, due solely to inflation, was not marital prop-
erty." This decision was grounded in the legislature's failure to in-
clude this type of increase in the "except for" language of section
401(e). 5
58. 131 P.L.J. 102 (C.P. 1983).
59. Id. at 104-05.
60. Id. at 105.
61. Id.
62. 48 Crawford Co.L.J. 42 (C.P. 1982).
63. Id. at 44. The court here was guided in its decision by the courts of New Jersey,
also an equitable distribution jurisdiction. See, e.g., Mol v. Mol, 147 N.J. Super. 5, 370 A.2d
509 (1977); Scherzer v. Scherzer, 136 N.J. Super. 397, 346 A.2d 434 (1975). These cases held
that where an increase in the value of separate property is attributable to expenditures or
efforts of the other spouse, such increase will be marital property.
64. 65 Erie Co.L.J. 58 (C.P. 1982). In an analogy to this rationale, one court has held
that the increase in value stated in 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 401(e)(3) (Purdon Supp. 1983-
1984), see supra note 15, refers to the market value of property other than money and
cannot include an interest award on money gifts. Clapper v. Clapper, 41 Somerset L.J. 215
(C.P. 1982).
65. 65 Erie Co.L.J. at 60.
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Generally, the treatment of increases in value of separately
owned property that is neither a gift nor an inheritance, nor prop-
erty acquired by exchange, is a problem worthy of legislative atten-
tion. By addressing the issue directly, the statute could eliminate
the dilemma of determining whether, and to what extent, an in-
crease is due to the efforts and contributions of the other spouse or
is merely the result of inflation.
For purposes of determining what is and is not marital property,
it is clear that property acquired between the separation date and
the date of divorce is the separate property of either spouse.""
However, even though the statute is silent as to the date for valua-
tion of marital property, the courts have established that marital
property is to be valued as of the date on which the complaint in
divorce is filed."' Of the possible dates for valuation, including the
date of separation and that of distribution, this would seem to be
the most reasonable point at which to fix the end of the marriage
and, consequently, the value of the marital property to be distrib-
uted. Most decisions of the courts of common pleas in which the
date of valuation has been an issue have reflected this conclusion."
This result is further supported by the code itself, which provides
in pertinent part that "[b]oth parties shall submit . . . an inven-
tory and appraisement of all property owned . . . at the time ac-
tion was commenced."69
Nevertheless, this appears to be another area in which the stat-
ute's lack of clarity has prompted an occasional divergent holding
when a court reasons that the equities of a particular case require
the use of a different date for valuation. For example, in Drake v.
Drake70 it was held that, in the case of assets which increase in
value through economic forces rather than the contributions of the
parties, equity demands the use of the latest available value rather
than an arbitrarily determined value fixed at the date of the filing
of the complaint.1
66. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 401(e)(4) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984). See supra note 15.
67. See infra note 68.
68. See, e.g., Graham v. Graham, 66 Erie Co.L.J. 45 (C.P. 1983); Mele v. Mele, 66 Erie
Co.L.J. 27 (C.P. 1983);Treasure v. Treasure, 130 P.L.J. 389 (C.P. Allegheny 1982); Klug v.
Klug, 130 P.L.J. 73 (C.P. Allegheny 1982). The basis for this conclusion lies in the code, see
infra note 69, as well as in the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, which also provides
that each party file an inventory and appraisal of all assets, with the value of each asset as
of the date the action was commenced. PA. R. Civ. P. 1920.33(a).
69. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 403(b) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984).
70. 111 Montgomery Co. L. Rep. 110 (C.P. 1982).
71. Another court, in determining the value of a closely held corporation, held that the
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Another statutory ambiguity significant in both classification
and valuation problems is illustrated by an attempt to reconcile
section 401(e)(1) (an increase in value during the marriage of prop-
erty acquired in exchange for pre-marital separate property will be
marital property); section 401(e)(3) (an increase in value during
the marriage of a gift or inheritance will be marital property); and
section 401(e)(4) (property acquired after separation will be sepa-
rate property). The statute does not make it clear whether the
phrase "during the marriage" in sections 401(e)(1) and (3) means
marriage up to the date of divorce, or only up to the date of sepa-
ration. It is conceivable, in light of section 401(e)(4), that marriage,
for the purpose of applying sections 401(e)(1) and (3), is ended as
of the date of separation. At least one court has concluded that no
other interpretation is possible.7
This problem in construction of the statute gives rise to another
issue with which it appears no court has yet been confronted. An
increase during the marriage in the value of separate property may
be determined to be marital property, and this increase, in turn,
may itself increase in value between the date of separation and the
date of the filing of the complaint. If value is determined as of the
date of filing, a question arises as to whether this additional in-
crease will be subject to distribution. The present state of the stat-
ute, enhanced by judicial interpretation, would seem to indicate
that the increase would be subject to distribution.
IV. DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY
After a court has determined what assets constitute marital
property, and has fixed their value, it must then distribute the
marital property between the parties. The statute directs that the
court shall equitably divide the marital property "in such propor-
tions as the court deems just '7' after considering any relevant fac-
tors including the ten factors enumerated by the statute:
date of separation was the appropriate date to fix its fair market value. Flojo v. Flojo, 42
Bucks Co. L. Rep. 37 (C.P. 1983).
72. Sorbello v. Sorbello, 31 Cumberland L.J. 372, 21 Pa. D. & C.3d 187 (C.P. 1981).
The court illustrated its reasoning by way of a hypothetical in which a spouse, separated but
with no intention to reconcile, could refuse to consent to divorce for a possible three year
period, and receive a share of an increase in the value of the other's inheritance during this
period. Id. at 192-93. In instances similar to the hypothetical in Sorbello, the court has at its
disposal broad equity powers. See 23 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 401(c) (Purdon Supp. 1983-
1984). See supra note 15.
73. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §401(d) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984). See supra note 15.
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(1) The length of the marriage.
(2) Any prior marriage of either party.
(3) The age, health, station, amount and sources of income, vocational skills,
employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties.
(4) The contribution by one party to the education, training, or increased
earning power of the other party.
(5) The opportunity of each party for future acquisitions of capital assets
and income.
(6) The sources of income of both parties, including but not limited to med-
ical, retirement, insurance or other benefits.
(7) The contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preser-
vation, depreciation or appreciation of the marital property, including the
contribution of a party as homemaker.
(8) The value of the property set apart to each party.
(9) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage.
(10) The economic circumstances of each party at the time the division of
property is to become effective.74
The statute, however, does not indicate what weight is to be ac-
corded each factor, nor the starting point at which to apply the
factors. It can be seen, therefore, that almost unlimited discretion
is granted a court to divide the marital property in what it views to
be the most equitable proportions given the particular circum-
stances of the marriage and the parties.7
While it appears then that an equitable distribution of marital
property is not necessarily an equal distribution, it also seems gen-
erally accepted that the appropriate starting point for considera-
tion of the above factors is an equal division.7 s This approach obvi-
ously best reflects the marriage-as-a-partnership concept. However,
at least one court has refused to adopt an equal split of marital
property as even a presumptive point at which to begin distribu-
tion. Again, the lack of direction provided by the statute has
74. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §401(d) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984). See supra note 15.
75. The statute provides that in any order made for the distribution of marital prop-
erty, the court must give its reason for the distribution. 23 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §404 (Pur-
don Supp. 1983-1984).
76. See, e.g., Hanrahan v. Hanrahan, 70 Delaware Co. Rep. 274 (C.P. 1983); J.K. v.
I.K., 73 Luzerne L. Reg. Rep. 64 (C.P. 1983); Lawrence v. Lawrence, 74 Berks Co.L.J. 298
(C.P.1982); Tonetti v.Tonetti, 39 Lehigh Co.L.J. 535 (C.P. 1982). For an extensive analysis
of the rationale for this conclusion, see Paul W. v. Margaret W., 130 P.L.J. 6 (C.P. Allegheny
1982).
77. Ruth v. Ruth, 67 Lancaster L. Rev. 461 (C.P. 1981). This court adopted the hold-
ing of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, an equitable distribution jurisdiction, upon whose
statute Pennsylvania's was modeled. See Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 320 A.2d 496
(1974). The court in Rothman rejected a 50-50 starting point as having no basis in the New
Jersey statute itself and believed that each case should be examined as an individual entity.
65 N.J. at 232-33 n.6, 320 A.2d at 503 n.6. This holding was specifically rejected by the court
Vol. 22:151
1983 Pennsylvania Divorce Code
prompted the courts of Pennsylvania to fashion guidelines most
likely to effectuate the goals of the code.
Although a thorough discussion of the provisions of the statute
permitting an award of alimony is beyond the scope of this com-
ment, it should be pointed out that, in any proceeding in which
applications for both equitable distribution and alimony are made,
an award of a portion of the marital assets will be a factor in a
court's decision whether to award alimony.
The code provides that a court may award alimony only if it
finds that the party seeking the award "(1) lacks sufficient prop-
erty. . . to provide for his or her reasonable needs; and (2) is una-
ble to support himself or herself through appropriate employ-
ment. '7'  The court, in concluding that a party lacks adequate
property to provide support, is required to consider any property
awarded to that spouse pursuant to section 401.'9 The court is then
provided with a list of fourteen factors it must weigh in determin-
ing whether alimony is indeed necessary, and in determining the
nature, amount, duration, and manner of payment.80 Futher, un-
less a spouse's ability to support himself or herself is significantly
in Paul W. v. Margaret W., 130 P.L.J. 6, 10 (C.P. Allegheny 1982).
78. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 501(a) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984).
79. Id. § 501(a)(1).
80. Id. § 501(b). These factors, not significantly different from those of § 401(d),
include:
(1) The relative earnings and earning capacities of the parties.
(2) The ages, and the physical, mental and emotional conditions of the parties.
(3) The sources of income of both parties including but not limited to medical, retire-
ment, insurance or other benefits.
(4) The expectancies and inheritances of the parties.
(5) The duration of the marriage.
(6) The contribution by one party to the education, training or increased earning
power of the other party.
(7) The extent to which it would be inappropriate for a party, because said party will
be custodian of a minor child, to seek employment outside the home.
(8) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage.
(9) The relative education of the parties and the time necessary to acquire sufficient
education or training to enable the party seeking alimony to find appropriate
employment.
(10) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties.
(11) The property brought to the marriage by either party.
(12) The contribution of a spouse as homemaker.
(13) The relative needs of the parties.
(14) The marital misconduct of either of the parties during the marriage; however,
the marital misconduct of either of the parties during separation subsequent to the
filing of a divorce complaint shall not be considered by the court in its determinations
relative to alimony.
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reduced, the court is directed to limit the duration of the award to
a reasonable time, sufficient to allow that spouse an opportunity to
obtain appropriate employment or develop an employable skill.81
In any specific factual situation, the operation of these provisions
in conjunction with those concerning equitable distribution will
necessarily involve a delicate balancing of the factors enumerated
by both provisions."2
V. CONCLUSION
It is obvious, given the great discretion allowed the courts, that
the answers to the questions of who gets what and in what
amounts will be as varied as the factual contexts in which these
decisions are made. The individual parties to a divorce will natu-
rally be more concerned with the ultimate awards than with the
judicial mechanics of the award process.
The parties may have already attempted to reach a mutually
satisfactory agreement concerning both alimony and property dis-
tribution. However, if this is an impossible goal, it will be neces-
sary for a court to fashion a settlement for them. A marriage that
was begun in optimism and hope, likely with no thought of future
conflicts which would require a court's intervention, might end
with the recording of those conflicts in the county reports. And
those conflicts may give rise to novel issues, the resolutions of
which will contribute to the evolution of the law of equitable dis-
tribution in Pennsylvania.
The legislature has fashioned a framework in which the rights of
each spouse may be justly determined, recognizing that neither
spouse should be penalized for the failure of the marriage, and that
both spouses should, in whatever manner appropriate to the cir-
cumstances of the marriage, be in some way compensated or re-
81. Id. § 501(c). Although this section indicates that in the usual case alimony will be
primarily rehabilitative, the court is permitted in atypical situations to extend the duration
of the award indefinitely, if warranted by the spouse's "age, physical, mental or emotional
condition, custody of minor children, or other compelling impediment to gainful employ-
ment . .. " Id.
82. One court commented, in the context of a discussion of the modification of an
alimony consent order, that "[w]e would be naive to think that trade-offs do not occur be-
tween equitable distribution and alimony." Fleming v. Fleming, 130 P.L.J. 68, 70 (C.P. Alle-
gheny 1982).
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warded for their contributions. Although questions remain to be
answered by judicial interpretation or legislative amendment,
Pennsylvania's law of divorce has entered the twentieth century.
Deborah Candace Phillips

